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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
*

Lynn Vincent Toone,

*

Plaintiff/Appellee,

Court of Appeals No. 960675 A

*
*

Va.

*

Ruby Joan Toone nka Ruby Joan Parkhurst, *
*

Defendant/Appellant.

District Court No. 19707
Priority Classification 15

*
*

BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Jurisdiction of this Court is governed by the Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(h,j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Plaintiff/Appellee adopts the issues presented for review designated by the
Appellant.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review is one of correctness, granting no deference to either party,
Glover vs. Boy Scouts ofAmerica. 923 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1996).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
Uniform Services Former Spouses Protection Act 10 USCA 1408. See Appendix
A for full text.
Statute of Limitations, Utah Code Annotated 78-12-1, 78-12-22. See Appendix B

for full text.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60, Clerical Errors. See Appendix C for full
text.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Appellant (Mrs. Toone/Parkhurst) brought this action to modify a divorce decree
entered December 16, 1983, seeking to adjudicate Appellant's entitlement to Appellee's
(Mr. Toone's) military retirement.
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
July 23, 1981. Divorce decree entered. The Court reserved issues of property
division for future determination.
July 9, 1982. Trial to allocate real and personal property.
December 16, 1983. Trial Court enters "Corrected Supplemental Findings of Fact
and Decree.
October 23, 1995. Defendant files a petition to divide Plaintiffs military
retirement.
September 25, 1996. Trial Court entered Summary Judgement, denying
Defendant's Petition.
C. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
The Trial Court granted Plaintiff/Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgement.
Defendant/Appellant appealed.
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Appellant's statement of facts assumes facts which are not supports .*:
conclusions not found in the record. The uncontested facts are as follows:
' 1.

' May, 1958. Plaintiff enters Nav\ Sen in-

2.

June 20, 1958. The parties were married.

• 3. ..'
4.

June22, l')81. I'lamlitl lilt" loi divorce. I-' "
June 26, 1981. U.S. Supreme Court decides McCarty vs. McCart\ \ 453

IT i . ~ I U I M i » I I

''

": '• '

5. • • June 30, 1981. Defendant-

:• • .

^ .wer and ":

Counterclaim asking that the Navy Retirement be divided R 4. See Appendix D,
paragraph *>
6.

July 23, 1981. The parties were divorced. R-15. The Trial C

issues uf property settlement for future resolution.
',

July 9, 1982. The Trial Court hears h»slim< «ii

i Ilic A\ \ i on \ A real .mJ

personal property.
September... t9&~. ;.

u, • -, i..» .

, _ overturning the

decision of McCarty vs. McCarty* retroactive to one day prior to McCarty on June 25,
^1.
November 4, 1982. Utah Supreme Court decide s the r;w . Woodward
vs. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982).
io.

December ; . is>8^

* Jiiir

of Law together with a Judgement.
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:

,K

conclusions

a.

Findings of Fact (R-50)(R-70) states, "Each of the parties has a

retirement," without detailing the sources.
b.

Judgement and Decree states, "Each of the parties has a

retirement," (R-52).
c.

The Corrected Supplemental Judgement and Decree states,

"Plaintiffs retirement is worth" $10,000.
d.
11.

No exhibits in the file show the worth of Mr. Toone's retirement.

The transcript of the trial held July 9, 1982 is unavailable. The Court file

fails to allocate Plaintiffs $10,000 retirement into one or more retirement plans.
12.

The Judgement and Decree makes no mention of "Navy Retirement" nor

"Utah State Retirement" nor "Civil Retirement".
13.

Lynn Toone entered the Service in May of 1958, and ultimately retired in

1976, thus accruing benefits. Military retirement is payable when Plaintiff/Appellee
reaches age 60 on May 3, 1998 (R-240).
14.

Defendant filed a petition seeking division of the benefits on October 23,

1995.
The Defendant's/Appellant's Brief contains several material false statements
which should be brought to the attention of this Court.
1.

Brief page 6, line 14 states that "Mr. Toone's Utah State non-military

retirement was worth approximately $10,000..." No such statement appears in the
Decree.
2.

Brief page 6, line 17. " The Court offset these two (2) civil retirements..."
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No such statement appears in the Decree.
3.

Brief page 6, line 20 states, "The Affidavits, subsequent exhibits and

Findings and Decree show that the Court dealt only with the civil retirements..."
Appellant assumes that the record refers only to civil retirement. Paragraph 10 of the
signed Decree says only "net credit of retirement."
4.

Brief page 9, line 14. "Both parties admit for purposes of this appeal that

the only retirements mentioned in the Decree of Divorce are Mr. Toone's retirement of
$10,000 from UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY." No such admission appears in the record.
What is admitted is that the Decree fails to mention "Navy retirement." It also fails to
mention by name Utah State Retirement or any other "civil" retirement.
5.

Brief page 9, line 18. "The parties admit for purposes of this Appeal that

only two (2) 'civil' retirements were discussed in the Court's Evidence and Findings."
This statement is false and is not borne out in the Motions nor Affidavits of the parties.
The Record on Appeal clearly shows that Appellant knew of the existence of the
"Navy retirement" (Verified Answer and Counterclaim), and she is presumed to know of
the existence of her rights under the Federal Statute.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT 1
Appellant claims that the Trial Court erred in concluding that the doctrine of Res
Judicata barred the Appellant's claim. Appellee contends that Appellant had knowledge
of the existence of the military retirement and should have been aware of the Federal
Statute, made retroactive to a date PRIOR TO the dates of the trial and signing of the
5

Judgement and Decree. In addition, the Judgement and Decree only states a retirement of
$10,000. Without a transcript of the Trial Court, it is impossible to tell whether or not the
Trial Court considered the military retirement.
POINT II
Appellant claims that the "(sic) retirement" can now be divided 12 years after the
entry of the Decree allocating the parties property interests. Appellee answers stating that
the right to partition military retirement is a statutory right under Uniform Services
Former Spouses Protection Act. There is an eight year Statute of Limitations.
Appellant's claim is barred.
POINT III
Defendant claims laches cannot be a defense in this case because the Trial Court
so held and no harm has occurred to Mr. Toone. Appellee disagrees with the Trial Court
and Mrs. Parkhurst. There has been a 12 to 13 year delay in enforcing a statutory right by
Mrs. Parkhurst. The parties and the Trial Court are without the benefit of the former Trial
Court's record and the assets of the parties have been divided. Mrs. Parkhurst knew of
the military retirement from the outset of the case, during the trials and lengthy delays.
She knew or should have know of her rights under the Uniform Services Former Spouse
Protection Act. Mr. Toone relied upon the military retirement to plan his own retirement.
POINT IV
Mrs. Parkhurst claims that the Trial Court erred in holding that there was no
change in circumstances when the Congress passed the Uniform Services Former Spouse
Protection Act. Congress passed the USFSPA in 1982, effective February 1, 1983, and
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made it retroactive to June 25, 1981. Mrs. Parkhurst could have and should have and
may have litigated her rights under the Act at the time of the divorce. Woodward vs.
Woodward was decided during the pendency of this case. There was no change in
circumstances between the parties by the passage of the Act, only a right of action created
by Federal Statute.
POINT V
Mrs. Parkhurst claims that the Supreme Court decision in McCarty barred her
from litigating her right to the "(sic) retirement". The facts of the case show that the
McCarty decision was decided June 26, 1981. The parties were divorced on July 23,
1981, but the Court reserved its ruling for the division of property until a year later on
July 9, 1982. The Findings and Decree were ultimately signed on December 16, 1983,
about 18 months later. Congress passed the USFSPA on September 8, 1982. The
effective date of the Act was February 1, 1983. However, Subsection (c)(1) contained a
retroactive date to June 25,1981. The time frame shows that Mrs. Parkhurst was not
barred from asserting her rights. The lack of a record of the Trial and later proceedings
leaves open to speculation the retirement actually considered by the Trial Court. The
Trial Court in 1996 acknowledged the speculative nature of Mrs. Parkhurst's argument
(R-226).
POINT VI
Mrs. Parkhurst claims that the Trial Court erred when it did not divide the
retirement benefits as all other property was divided on an equal basis. Mr. Toone
responds by noting that the original Trial Court did not define the source of the retirement
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benefits, and therefore, there is no evidence that the military benefits were or were not
included in the $10,000 lump sum figure used by the Court to calculate approximately the
equal division of property. Mrs. Parkhurst's continual use of the phrase "civil retirement"
does not alter the lack of specifics in the original Decree.
DETAILED ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF "RES
JUDICATA" BARRED APPELLANT'S CLAIM TO A DIVISION OF THE NAVY
RETIREMENT WHERE THE NAVAL (sic) RETIREMENT WAS NOT EXPRESSLY
ADJUDICATED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
The Appellant/Mrs. Parkhurst litigated the issues in her divorce from April of
1981 until December of 1983. During this period of time, the U.S. Supreme Court, on
June 26, 1981, held that military retirement pay was not divisible by State Courts.
Congress reacted and passed the Former Spouse Protection Act, making it retroactive to
June 25, 1981. The Supreme Court of this State decided Woodward vs. Woodward, infra.
The knowledge of these decisions are imputed to the Appellant. Further compounding
the situation is the lack of a transcript from the original Trial Court and Findings of Fact
and a Judgement, which are silent as to the source of the $10,000 retirement owned by
Mr. Toone.
The Trial Court Memorandum Decision (R-226) recognizes that 13 years have
lapsed since the Judgement of the initial Trial Court.
In this case, certainly the value of the military retirement could have and may have
been considered by the Court
If the Court did not then address the issue with
respect to military retirement, and should do so now, it would have to relitigate
each of those other property and support issues which have been raised, litigated
and ruled upon. In doing so, the rule of Res Judicata would be avoided. Page 2,
8

Memorandum Decision, September 10, 1996.
The Supreme Court decision of McCartv vs. McCartv did not prevent the
litigation of this issue. Mrs. Parkhurst knew of the military retirement and could have
litigated the matter. She, in fact, may have litigated the issue. The transcript is not
available. In Throckmorton vs. Throckmorton, 161 P.2d 121 (Utah App 1988), this Court
determined that subsequent recognition of retirement benefits is not a substantial change
in circumstances, thus precluding the application of Res Judicata. The Court recognized
that principle, noting that the Trial Court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent
changes to property distribution, but that Courts are hesitant to disturb prior property
distributions.
However, the application of kes juaicaia is unique in divorce actions because of
the equitable doctrine which allows Courts to reopen alimony, support or property
distributions if the moving party can demonstrate a substantial change in
circumstances, since the matter was previously considered by the Court,
Thompson vs. Thompson. 709 P.2d 360 (Utah 1985).
The Texas cases cited by the Appellant are not pertinent unless this Court overturns
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, infra.
POINT II
APPELLANT CLAIMS THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
APPLYING THE EIGHT YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATION TO BAR
APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR A DIVISION OF MILITARY RETIREMENT.
A. Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court of this State has held that former
spouses are tenant in common of retirement funds, which is contrary to the assertion in
the Appellant's Brief. UCA 30-3-5 grants Courts jurisdiction to make orders in relation
to property. Mr. Toone's military retirement is in his name alone. Woodward determines
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that an asset accrued during marriage is subject to equitable distribution and not tenants in
common ownership, (Woodward vs. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 at page 433). This
retirement could have been or was distributed.
The cases of Iverson vs. Iverson, 526 P.2d 1126 (Utah 1974) and Booth vs Booth,
722 P.2d 771 (Utah 1986) do not stand for the proposition suggested by Appellant, as
they deal with joint tenant ownership of real property. Nor does Masseyvs

Protazro,

664 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1983) apply, as it deals with tax titles.
B. The Appellant claims the Statute of Limitations does not apply in this
equitable action. The Appellant's right to divide military retirement is governed by
statutory law. The USFSPA created the right, which is a legal remedy. Utah's Divorce
Law requires an equitable distribution. Therefore, the Trial Courts are obligated to
equitably distribute those assets divisible by statute. The Judgement in this case dated
December 16, 1983, is a Decree. The Petition case dated October 23, 1995, in this case
seeks to modify the Corrected Supplemental Divorce Decree. Eight years has expired
since the rendition of the Judgement, UCA 78-12-1, 78-12-22.
C. The Appellant claims that the Statute of Limitations is not applicable because
Congress made the USFSPA retroactive to a day before the McCarty decision. The
retroactive provision of the Act provided the Appellant an opportunity to fully and
completely litigate her claim for military retirement. The effective date of the statute was
June 26,1981, and the Decree was signed on December 16, 1983. The record shows no
attempt to alter the general terms of the Decree to specify the type of retirement
considered.
10

D. Appellant claims that a reservation by the Trial Court of jurisdiction tolls the
Statute of Limitations. This argument is made without citation of statute or cases.
Throckmorton, infra, provides an answer. The reservation of continuing jurisdiction
found in the Statute (30-3-5 UCA) and as recited in the decree does not toll the Statute.
A substantial change in circumstances, giving rise to a new claim for relief is not barred
by Res Judicata. Where an issue was or could have been litigated and wasn't, under
Throckmorton Res Judicata applies. If there is or could have been a judication, and a
judgement is prepared, that commences the running of the Statute of Limitations.
E. Defendant/Appellant claims that the Court has continuing jurisdiction to
review property matters under UCA 30-3-5.
Not so. If that were the case, there would never be an end to divorce litigation,
(rarely is there an end now). Again, Mr. Toone reiterates that the "retirement" was not
designated. This Court has no transcript. UCA 30-3-5 does not allow a subsequent Court
to arbitrarily relitigate the issue without a substantial change in circumstances, Iverson vs.
Iverson. 526 P.2d 1126.
Notwithstanding the equitable powers of the District Court in inter-family
controversies in divorce matters and the acknowledged broad latitude of discretion
allowed therein, the Court cannot act arbitrarily, or on supposition or conjecture as
to facts upon which to justify its order.
In the absence of any proceeding in which evidence was taken relating to the
equities of the parties; and in the absence of a transcript of any evidence of that
character, we do not see in this record any justification for the granting of a
Motion for Summary Judgement...
Rule 60 allows amendment of "clerical errors" not substantive matters.
POINT III
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APPELLANT CLAIMS THAT LACHES CANNOT BE A DEFENSE IN THE CASE
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT SO HELD AND NOT HARM HAS OCCURRED TO
MR. TOONE.
It should be noted that this Court is not bound by an erroneous ruling of law of the
Trial Court. See Standard of Review, Page 4, Appellant's Brief.
Laches may, in fact, be the appropriate legal and equitable doctrine in this case.
Laches required that there be an unreasonable delay in bringing the action. In this case,
there is at least a 13 year delay. That delay has not only faded the memories of the parties
but occasioned usage of attorneys not privy to the initial proceedings. No transcript is
available to determine what, in fact, the Court considered as "retirement". The
nonspecific Decree, drawn by Appellant's attorney complicates determination of
"retirement". Therefore, the Appellant's delay has been unreasonable and has deprived
both parties of needed recollection and evidence.
The second prong in the test for laches is that the Plaintiff/Appellee has been
prejudiced by the delay. The Trial Court recognized the problem when it stated in the
Memorandum Decision that if the Court litigated the issue of retirement, it may have to
modify all other property matters that were considered by the Court. It can be reasonably
assumed that Mr. Toone relied on the Judgement and Decree for the past 13 years in
planning his future. His Utah State Retirement was cashed in to pay Mrs. Parkhurst her
equity in the home. To now divide military retirement would be a substantial burden on
him. Nothing in the record reveals a need on Appellant's part for the retirement money.
Appellant cites the case of Openshaw vs Openshaw* 144 P.2d 528 (Utah 1943) for
the proposition that laches cannot be imputed to one who is ignorant of the facts and for
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that reason, failed to assert her rights. An additional citation from that case might be
beneficial.
Page 531. But mere inaction or delay, short of the period of limitations, in
enforcement of payment of an obligation already accrued, without more, is
insufficient upon which to predicate laches.
Sheppard's Utah Citations reflects many cases decided after Openshaw, but none
overruling the case law established. Therefore, Appellant having taken no action withing
the period of limitations under the Openshaw decision, the doctrine of laches should
apply.
Appellant contends that laches does not apply to retirement benefits received
prospectively because there is not prejudice to the serviceman. Thereafter, the Appellant
cites two Arizona cases, Beltran vs. Razo* 788 P.2d 1256 (Ariz App. 1990) and Flynn vs.
Rogers, 834 P.2d 148 (Ariz 1992). At the expense of sounding over simplistic, these
cases are not relevant. First, they are from a neighbor state that is a community property
state. Arizona has a statute which creates a tenancy in common in retirement assets,
A.R.S. Section 25-318 (B). Utah has no similar statute. Second, the case was brought
within the period of limitations. The serviceman/husband claimed laches. The argument
was rejected by the Arizona Court. Under Arizona law, the military benefits were, after
USFSPA held by the parties as tenants in common, and therefore, the division by the
Court was merely procedural.
Utah does not have a statute similar to the Arizona statute making the parties
tenants in common. Utah Courts have not held that the parties are tenants in common.
Such a ruling is inconsistent with present common law principles in Utah. Appellant
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mixes common law principles and community property law principles. Such a mix is
necessary for the Appellant to rationalize the result suggested.
POINT IV
APPELLANT CLAIMS THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING NO CHANGE IN
CIRCUMSTANCES OCCURRED JUSTIFYING REOPENING THE DECREE.
Appellant claims that the enactment of the USFSPA created a change in
circumstances. Throckmorton, infra, sets forth the distinction between and change in
circumstances as it relates to factual circumstances. This is distinguished from a change
in legal precedent or statute which Throckmorton, infra, held not to be a substantial
change in circumstances.
Legal recognition of a new category of property rights after a divorce decree has
been entered is not itself sufficient to establish a substantial change in
circumstances (at page 124).
McCarty may have changed Utah Law for a brief period of time, but the
enactment of the USFSPA nullified the decision. The Decree allocating property rights in
this case was signed after enactment of the USFSPA without objection by Appellant.
Appellant continues to miscite the date of the entry of the property settlement. Entry of a
divorce without more is not a final decree and that date has no relevance. Copier vs.
Copier, 318 Ut. Adv. Rep. 9 states that the date of the final decree is the date concluding
the divorce. Therefore, the pertinent date in this case is December 16, 1983.
POINT V
APPELLANT CLAIMS THAT MILITARY RETIREMENT EARNED DURING THE
MARRIAGE IS CONSIDERED MARITAL PROPERTY UNDER UTAH LAW AND
CAPABLE OF DIVISION WERE IT NOT FOR THE McCarthy DECISION.
The reply to this issue is found in the facts. McCarthy was decided on June 26,
14

1981. The parties were divorced in July of 1981. The Trial Court decided only the issue
of the divorce and left until a future date the issues of property settlement. The case
lingered on, and one year later in July of 1982, a hearing was held dividing the real and
personal property. In November, the Supreme Court decided Woodward, infra. In
September of that year, Congress passed the USFSPA with an effective date of February
|l, 1993. The ruling in McCarthy was effectively voided by the retroactive provision.
IThis case still languished in the Utah Court System until December of 1983 when
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree were presented to the District Judge.
Wo party before or after entry of the Decree filed a Motion to Amend the Findings
specifying which retirements the Trial Court referenced, nor did either party cite
Woodward or the USFSPA as dictating a clarification of the Findings and Decree.
Appellee has no quarrel with the proposition that military retirement is a marital
asset and that the retirement is capable of division. The plain and simple fact is that
Appellant knew of the military retirement and had an opportunity to litigate retirement
and did so in such nonspecific terms that the Trial Court now is unable to make a decision
without readjudicating the entire case in the absence of a transcript. Appellant's attorney
drew the Findings and Decree, and the same law firm now seeks a second hearing 13
years later to litigate military retirement separately from the prior division of assets.
Appellant is barred not only by laches, but by the Statute of Limitations.
POINT VI
THE APPELLANT CLAIMS THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
GRANTING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT.
In this discussion, Appellant continues to assume that the "retirement" mentioned
15

in the Findings and Decree are "civil" retirements only. The Trial Court did not make
that assumption in the Memorandum Decision. Nor can anyone without a transcript.
Appellant's use of the phrase "civil retirement" does not create a fact, but it does tend to
enforce her position if his Court were to believe that fact.
Appellant cites the cases of Bailevvs. Bailey\ 745 P.2d 830 (Utah App. 1987) and
Mar chant vs. Mar chant, 143 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987). It is not clear how those cases
relate to this case, as in each instance the Trial Court at the time of the entry of the Decree
divided the retirement, (although incorrectly). The appeals dealt with the date and
manner of distribution, not the date of the adjudication.
The Bailey case, infra, relates to the allocation of liquid assets (house) with a
present value offset by future valued assets (retirement). This case has no bearing on the
issue presented by Appellant.
Likewise, the Marchant case, infra, deals with the failure of the Trial Court to
properly address the division of retirement, as set forth in Woodward vs. Woodward,
infra.
CONCLUSION
This is not a case of first impression. The decision in this case is controlled by
Federal Statute and pre-existing case law decided by the two Appellate courts of this
State.
The important facts are the dates of the events, showing that the Appellant could
have, should have, and may have litigated the issue of military retirement. Time bars
Appellant's claim.
16

This decision of the Trial Court should be affirmed
DATED this'Aiay of July, 1997.

George W. Preston
Attorney for Appellee
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE to Mr. Marlin J. Grant. Attorney for Appellant, 88 West
renter, P.O. Box 525, Logan, Utah 84321, onthisj^ay of July, 1997.
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Tab A

10 6 1407

GENERAL MILITARY LAW SUM. A

(f) In the case of a member who is retired under any section of title 14,
the monthly retired pay base is one thirty-sixth of the total amount of
monthly basic pay which the member received for any 36 months (whether
or not consecutive) of active duty as a member of a uniformed service.
(g) In the case of a member whose retired pay is computed under section
16 of the Coast and Geodetic Survey Commissioned Officers* Act of 1948
(33 U.S.C. 853<?), the monthly retired pay base is one thirty-sixth of the
total amount of monthly basic pay which the member received for any 36
months (whether or not consecutive) of active duty as a member of a uniformed service.
(h) In the case of a member who is retired under section 210(g) or 211(a)
of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 211(g) and 212(a)), the monthly
retired pay base is one thirty-sixth of the total amount of monthly basic pay
which the membej received for any 36 months (whether or not consecutive)
of active duty as a member of a uniformed service.
(Added Pub.L*. 9 6 - 3 4 2 , Title VIII, § 813(a)(1), Sept. 8, 1980, 94 Stat. 1100, and
amended Pub.L. 9 6 - 5 1 3 , Title I, § 113(c), Title V, §§ 501(21). 511(53), Dec. 12,
1980, 94 Stat. 2877, 2908, 2925.)
M-

Historical Note
References In Text. Section 16 of the
Coast and Geodetic Survey Commissioned
Officers' Act of 1948 (33 U.SC. 853o). referred to in subsec. (g), is section 16 of Act
June 3, 1948. c 390, 62 Stat. 299, which is
classified to section 853o of Title 33, Navigation and Navigable Waters.
Section 210(g) and 211(a) of the Public
Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 211(g) and
212(a)), referred to in subsec. (h), are sections
210(g) and 211(a) of Act July I, 1944, c 373,
Title II, 58 Stat. 687, 688, which are classified
to sections 211(g) and 212(a) of Title 42, The
Public Health and Welfare, respectively
1980 Amendment. Subsec. (a)(1). Pub L.
96-513, § 511(53), substituted "after September 7, 1980" for "on or after the date of the

Subsec. (d)(1). Pub.L. 96-513, § 501(21),
substituted "or 6383" for "6381, 6383, 6390,
6394, 6396, 6398, or 6400".
Effective Date of 1980 Amendment.
Amendment by sections 113(c) and 501(21)
o f P u b L 9 6 _ 5 | 3 effective Sept 15, 1981, but
t h e aut hority to prescribe regulations under
the amendment by section 113(c) of Pub.L
96-513 effective on Dec. 12, 1980, see section
701 of Pub.L. 96-513, set out as an Effective
Date of 1980 Amendment note under section
101 of this title.
Amendment by section 511(53) of Pub L
96-513 effective Dec. 12. 1980, see section
701(b)(3) of Pub L. 96-513. set out as an Effective Date of 1980 Amendment note under
section 101 of this title,

enactment of the Department of Defense Authonzation Act. 1981".
ftnd
Subsec. (b)(4). Pub L. 96-513. § 113(c),
added references to sections 633, 634, 635,
636. and 1251.

Legislative History. For legislative history
purpose 0[ p„b L. 96-342. see 1980 US
Code Cong and Adm News, p. 2612. See,
also, Pub L 96-513, 1980 U.S. Code Cong.
and Adm.News, p. 6333.

Cross References
Computation of retired pay of personnel of—
Air Force, see section 8991 of this title.
Army, see section 3991 of this title.
Coast Guard, see section 423 of Title 14, Coast Guard
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, see section 853o of Title 33, Navigation and Navigable Waters.
Computation of retired pay of personnel of Public Health Service—
Commissioned officers, see section 212 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare.
Officers of Regular Corps in full grade twice failing selection for promotion, see section
211 of Title 42.
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Higher retired pay for members of Navy or Marine Corps who serve satisfactorily under temporary appointments, see section 6151 of this title
Recomputatton of retired pay to reflect advancement on retired list—
Air Force, see section 8992 of this title.
Army, see section 3992 of this title.
Retainee pay of member transferred to Fleet Reserve or Fleet Marine Corps Reserve when not
on active duty, see section 6330 of this title.
Retired grade and pay of—
Enlisted members of Regular Navy or Marine Corps with thirty or more years of service,
see section 6326 of this title.
Officers with forty and thirty years of service in Regular Navy or Marine Corps or retired
while serving as admiral, vice admiral, general, or lieutenant general by virtue of
temporary appointment, see section 6325 of this title.
Officers with thirty years of service in Regular Navy or Marine Corps, see section 6322 of
this title.
Officers with twenty years of service in Navy or Marine Corps, see section 6323 of this
title.
Retired pay of regular officers of Navy or Marine Corps designated for limited duty—
In grades of lieutenant commander in Navy and of major in Marine Corps for failure of
selection for promotion, see section 6383 of this title.
Upon completion of thirty years of service, see section 6383 of this title.
Library References
Armed Services <g=>23 4.

§ 1408.

C.J.S Armed Services §§ 80, 114 to 120.

Payment of retired or retainer pay in compliance with
court orders

(a) In this section:
(1) "Court** means—
(A) any court of competent jurisdiction of any State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam,
American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands;
(B) any court of the United States (as defined in section 451 of
title 28) having competent jurisdiction; and
( O any court of competent jurisdiction of a foreign country
with which the United States has an agreement requiring the United States to honor any court order of such country.
(2) "Court order" means a final decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation issued by a court, or a court ordered, ratified,
or approved property settlement incident to such a decree (including a
final decree modifying the terms of a previously issued decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation, or a court ordered,
ratified, or approved property settlement incident to such previously
issued decree), which—
(A) is issued in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction of
that court;
(B) provides for—
(1) payment of child support (as defined in section 462(b) of
the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 662(b)));
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(ii) payment of alimony (as defined in section 462(c) of the
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C 662(c))); or
(HD division of property (including a division of community
property); and

( O specifically provides for the payment of an amount, expressed in dollars or as a percentage of disposable retired or retainer pay, from the disposable retired or retainer pay of a member to
the spouse or former spouse of that member.
(3) "Final decree" means a decree from which no appeal may be taken or from which no appeal has been taken within the time allowed for
taking such appeals under the laws applicable to such appeals, or a
decree from which timely appeal has been taken and such appeal has
been finally decided under the laws applicable to such appeals.
(4) "Disposable retired or retainer pay" means the total monthly retired or retainer pay to which a member is entitled (other than the
retired pay of a member retired for disability under chapter 61 of this
title) less amounts which—
(A) are owed by that member to the United States;
(B) are required by law to be and are deducted from the retired
or retainer pay of such member, including fines and forfeitures ordered by courts-martial, Federal employment taxes, and amounts
waived in order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38;
( O arc properly withheld for Federal, State, or local income tax
purposes, if the withholding of such amounts is authorized or required by law and to the extent such amounts withheld are not
greater than would be authorized if such member claimed all dependents to which he was entitled;
(D) are withheld under section 3402(i) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 3402(i)) if such member presents evidence
of a tax obligation which supports such withholding;
(E) are deducted as Government life insurance premiums (not
including amounts deducted for supplemental coverage); or
(F) are deducted because of an election under chapter 73 of this
title to provide an annuity to a spouse or former spouse to whom
payment of a portion of such member's retired or retainer pay is
being made pursuant to a court order under this section.
(5) "Member** includes a former member.
(6) "Spouse or former spouse" means the husband or wife, or former
husband or wife, respectively, of a member who, on or before the date
of a court order, was married to that member.
(b) For the purposes of this section—
(1) service of a court order is effective if—
(A) an appropriate agent of the Secretary concerned designated
for receipt of service of court orders under regulations prescribed
pursuant to subsection (h) or, if no agent has been so designated,
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the Secretary concerned, is personally served or is served by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested;
(B) the court order is regular on its face;
( O the court order or other documents served with the court
order identify the member concerned and include the social security number of such member; and
(D) the court order or other documents served with the court
order certify that the rights of the member under the Soldiers' and
Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 U.S.C.App. 501 et seq.) were
observed; and
(2) a court order is regular on its face if the order—
(A) is issued by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(B) is legal in form; and
( O includes nothing on its face that provides reasonable notice
that it is issued without authority of law.
(c)(1) Subject to the limitations of this section, a court may treat disposable retired or retainer pay payable to a member for pay periods beginning
after June 25, 1981, either as property solely of the member or as property
of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction
of such court.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this section does not create any right, title, or interest which can be sold, assigned, transferred, or
otherwise disposed of (including by inheritance) by a spouse or former
spouse.
(3) This section does not authorize any court to order a member to apply
for retirement or retire at a particular time in order to effectuate any payment under this section.
(4) A court may not treat the disposable retired or retainer pay of a member in the manner described in paragraph (1) unless the court has jurisdiction over the member by reason of (A) his residence, other than because of
military assignment, in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, (B) his domicile in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or (C) his consent to the jurisdiction of the court.
(d)(1) After effective service on the Secretary concerned of a court order
with respect to the payment of a portion of the retired or retainer pay of a
member to the spouse or a former spouse of the member, the Secretary
shall, subject to the limitations of this section, make payments to the spouse
or former spouse in the amount of the disposable retired or retainer pay of
the member specifically provided for in the court order. In the case of a
member entitled to receive retired or retainer pay on the date of the effective
service of the court order, such payments shall begin not later than 90 days
after the date of effective service. In the case of a member not entitled to
receive retired or retainer pay on the date of the effective service of the
court order, such payments shall begin not later than 90 days after the date
on which the member first becomes entitled to receive retired or retainer
pay.
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(2) If the spouse or former spouse to whom payments are to be made
under this section was not married to the member for a period of 10 years
or more during which the member performed at least 10 years of service
creditable in determining the member's eligibility for retired or retainer pay,
payments may not be made under this section to the extent that they include
an amount resulting from the treatment by the court under subsection (c) of
disposable retired or retainer pay of the member as property of the member
or property of the member and his spouse.
(3) Payments under this section shall not be made more frequently than
once each month, and the Secretary concerned shall not be required to vary
normal pay and disbursement cycles for retired or retainer pay in order to
comply with a court order.
(4) Payments from the disposable retired or retainer pay of a member
pursuant to this section shall terminate in accordance with the terms of the
applicable court order, but not later than the date of the death of the member or the date of the death of the spouse or former spouse to whom payments are being-made, whichever occurs first.
(5) If a court order described in paragraph (1) provides for a division of
property (including a division of community property) in addition to an
amount of disposable retired or retainer pay, the Secretary concerned shall,
subject to the limitations of this section, pay to the spouse or former spouse
of the member, from the disposable retired or retainer pay of the member,
any part of the amount payable to the spouse or former spouse under the
division of property upon effective service of a final court order of garnishment of such amount from such retired or retainer pay.
(e)(1) The total amount of the disposable retired or retainer pay of a
member payable under subsection (d) may not exceed SO percent of such
disposable retired or retainer pay.
(2) In the event of effective service of more than one court order which
provide for payment to a spouse and one or more former spouses or to more
than one former spouse from the disposable retired or retainer pay of a
member, such pay shall be used to satisfy (subject to the limitations of paragraph (1)) such court orders on afirst-come,first-servedbasis. Such court
orders shall be satisfied (subject to the limitations of paragraph (1)) out of
that amount of disposable retired or retainer pay which remains after the
satisfaction of all court orders which have been previously served.
OKA) In the event of effective service of conflicting court orders under
this section which assert to direct that different amounts be paid during a
month to the same spouse or former spouse from the disposable retired or
retainer pay of the same member, the Secretary concerned shall—
(i) pay to that spouse the least amount of disposable retired or retainer pay directed to be paid during that month by any such conflicting court order, but not more than the amount of disposable retired or
retainer pay which remains available for payment of such court orders
based on when such court orders were effectively served and the limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4);
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(ii) retain an amount of disposable retired=or retainer pay that is
equal to the lesser of—
(I) the difference between the largest amount of retired or retainer pay required by any conflicting court order to be paid to the
spouse or former spouse and the amount payable to the spouse or
former spouse under clause (i); and
(II) the amount of disposable retired or retainer pay which remains available for payment of any conflicting court order based
on when such court order was effectively served and the limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4); and
(iii) pay to that member the amount which is equal to the amount of
that member's disposable retired or retainer pay (less any amount paid
during such month pursuant to legal process served under section 459
of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659) and any amount paid during
such month pursuant to court orders effectively served under this section, other than such conflicting court orders) minus—
(I) the amount of disposable retired or retainer pay paid under
clause (i); and
(II) the amount of disposable retired or retainer pay retained
under clause (ii).
(B) The Secretary concerned shall hold the amount retained under clause
(ii) of subparagraph (a) until such time as that Secretary is provided with a
court order which has been certified by the member and the spouse or former spouse to be valid and applicable to the retained amount. Upon being
provided with such an order, the Secretary shall pay the retained amount in
accordance with the order.
(4)(A) In the event of effective service of a court order under this section
and the service of legal process pursuant to section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659), both of which provide for payments during a month
from the retired or retainer pay of the same member, such court orders and
legal process shall be satisfied on a first-come, first-serve basis. Such court
orders and legal process shall be satisfied out of moneys which are subject to
such orders and legal process and which remain available in accordance
with the limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of this paragraph during such month after the satisfaction of all court orders or legal
process which have been previously served.
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the total amount of the
disposable retired or retainer pay of a member payable by the Secretary concerned under all court orders pursuant to this section and all legal processes
pursuant to section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659) with
respect to a member may not exceed 65 percent of the disposable retired or
retainer pay payable to such member.
(5) A court order which itself or because of previously served court orders provides for the payment of an amount of disposable retired or retainer
pay which exceeds the amount of such pay available for payment because of
the limit set forth in paragraph (1), or which, because of previously served
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Historical Note
References In Text. Section 462 of the So
< n T . I .«,
Jan 4 ,975
c.al Security Act, referred to ,„ subsec (a)(2
l\l'£h !*:""**
'
- *•* L
§
B)(i), („). and section 459 of that V t reI t L
l°,(a\ 8 8 S t a t
2357, and
c,ass,fied t o
Terred to in subsec (eX3XA)(ui), (4)(A) 'fB>
IZI ASO'
**
sections 662
(5) and (6). are sections ?62 of Act Aug f i '
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c.
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Code of 1954, referred to in subsec (aX4XD)
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K classified to section 3402(i) of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code
The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
of l<>40, referred to in subsec (bXIXD), is
Act Oct 17, 1940, c 888, 54 Stat 1178,
which is classified generally to section 501 et
seq of the Appendix to Title 50, War and
National Defense
For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 501
of the Appendix to Title 50, and Tables volume
Effective Date: Transition Provisions.
Section 1006 of Pub L 97-252 provided that

"(d) The amendments made by section
1004 of this title [enacting sections 1072(2)(F)
and i086(cX3) and amending section 1076(b)
of Jhis title] and the provisions of section
1005 of this title (set out as a note under section 1408 of this title] shall apply in the case
of any former spouse of a member or former
member of the uniformed services only if the
final decree of divorce, dissolution, or annulment of the marriage of the former spouse
and such member or former member is dated
on or after the effective date [Feb 1, 1983,
provided in subsec (a) ] of such amendments
"(e) For the purposes of this section—

"(a) The amendments made by this title
[enacting this section and sections 1072(2)(F),
I086(CX3), and 1447(6H10) and amending
sections 1448(aX3XA), (B), (b), and 1450(a)
(4), (0 of this title and enacting provisions set
out as notes under section 1401 of this title
and this section] shall take effect on the first
day of the first month [Feb 1, 1983J which
begins more than one hundred and twenty
days after the date of the enactment of this
title [Sept 8, I982J
"(b) Subsection (d) of section 1408 of title
10, United States Code [subsec (d) of this
section], as added by section 1002(a), shall
apply on!) with respect to payments of retired
or retainer pay for periods beginning on or after the effective date of this title [Feb 1,
1983, provided in subsec (a)], but without
regard to the date of any court order However, in the case of a court order that became
final before June 26, 1981, payments under
such subsection may only be made in accordance with such order as in effect on such
date and without regard to any subsequent
modifications

"(1) the term 'court order' has the same
meaning as provided in section 1408(aX2)
of title 10, United States Code [subsec (a)
(2) of this section] (as added by section
1002 of this title),
"(2) the term 'former spouse' has the
same meaning as provided in section
1408(a)(6) of such title [subsec (aX6) of
this section] (as added by section 1002 of
this title), and
"(3) the term 'uniformed services' has
the same meaning as provided in section
1408(a)(7) of such title [subsec (a)(7) of
this section] (as added by section 1002 of
this title)'
Short Title. For Short Title of Pub L
97-252, T/tle X, Sept 8, 1982, 96 Stat 730,
constituting "FORMER SPOUSES' PROTECTION" provisions, see Short Title of
1982 Amendments note set out under section
1401 of this title

Commissary and Exchange Privileges.
Section 1005 of Pub L 97-252 provided that
"The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe
"(c) The amendments made by section
such regulations as may be necessary to pro1003 of this title (enacting section 1447(6) to
vide that an unremarried former spouse de(10) and amending sections 1448(a)(3)(A),
scribed in subparagraph (F)(i) of section
(B), (b) and 1450(a)(4), ( 0 of this title] shall
1072(2) of title 10, United States Code [secapply to persons who become eligible to partion 1072(2)(F)(i) of this title] (as added by
ticipate in the Survivor Benefit Plan provided
section 1004), is entitled to commissary and
for in subchapter II of chapter 73 of title 10,
United States Code, [section 1447 et seq of post exchange privileges to the same extent
this title], before, on, or after the effective
and on the same basis as the surviving spouse
date of such amendments [Feb \, 1983, proof a retired member of the uniformed servided in subsec (a) ]
vices "
N o t e s of Decisions
Offsets against retired pay 2
triggered trial court's granting of relief, grantRetroactive effect of court decisions
ing of certiorari in case in which Supreme
Court had held that military retirement pensions were not subject to division as community property, was not itself change in law, at
I Retroactive effect of court decisions
time motion to set aside interlocutory judgEven if this section should be given proment was before trial court there was no
spective application only where event which
change of law sufficient to permit husband to
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evade efTects of his own stipulation dividing
husband's military pension, thus, trial court
abused its discretion in setting aside that portion of interlocutory decree dividing husband's military pension In re Marriage of
Frederick, Cal App 1981. 190 Cal Rptr 588
Use by Congress of date that Supreme
Court decided that military retirement pensions were not subject to division as community property upon dissolution of marriage as
reference in this section evidenced legislative
intent that law relative to community proper*
ty treatment of military retirement pensions
be as though Supreme Court holding did not
exist, that is, that such pensions would be
subject to division as community property before and after Supreme Court decision Id
Although Superior Court awarded wife a
one-half community interest in portion of
husband's military, retirement pension which
accrued during years of marriage, and although, three months after final judgment of
dissolution -was entered, United States Supreme Court decided McCarty v McCarty,
Cal 1981, 101 SCt 2728, 453 US 210, 69
L Ed 2d 589. holding that federal law prohibits division of military retirement pensions
and preempts state community property law,
the award of a community interest in hus-

SUBT. A

band's pension to his wife would not be re
versed under a retroactive application of Mc
Carty, since Congress, subsequent to
McCarty, enacted this section whose purpose
was to overrule McCarty, and since the law
as it now stands thus supports the Superior
Court's award In re Marriage of Buikema,
1983, 188 Cal Rptr 856, 139 Cal App 3d 689
Arizona community property law could be
applied in determining divisibility of interest
in military retirement benefits earned during
marriage, at least in cases still pending in trial
court or on appeal at time of enactment of
this section removing federal preemption of
state community property laws, with regard
to military retirement benefits, found by United States Supreme Court to exist under prior
law Steczo v Steczo, 1983, 659 P 2d 1344,
135 Anz 199
2. Offsets against retired pay
In divorce proceeding, trial court did not
err in awarding wife entire unpaid balance
due on parties' home, which had been sold,
although husband contended balance on
house was awarded to wife as offset against
husband's military retirement pay Matter of
Marriage of Smedley, 1982, 653 P 2d 267, 60
Or App 249

CHAPTER 73—ANNUITIES BASED O N
RETIRED OR RETAINER P A r
Subchapter
I. Retired Serviceman's Family Protection Plan
II. Survivor Benefit Plan

Sec.
1431
1447

Historical Note
Codification. Pub L 92-425 amended the 2925, in chapter heading struck out ", Sumchapter heading without reference to the ear- vor Benefit Plan" following "Pay"
her amendment by Pub L 87-381, § 1(1),
Oct 4, 1961, 75 Stat 810, which substituted
1972 Amendment. Pub L 92-425, § 1(1),
"Retired Serviceman's Family Protection Sept 21, 1972, 86 Stat 706, added subchapter
Plan" for "Annuities Based on Retired or Re- analysts
tamer Pay" Amendment by Pub L 92-425,
§ 1(1), Sept 21, 1972. 86 Stat 706, has been
1 9 6 1 Amendment. Pub L 87-381, § 1(1).
executed to chapter heading as originally en- Q^ 4> 1961f 75 Stat 810. substituted "ReKit
&
tired Serviceman s Family Protection Plan"
1980 Amendments. Pub L 96-513, Title for "Annuities Based on Retired or Retainer
V, $ 5!1(54)(A), Dec 12, 1980. 94 Stat
Pay" in chapter heading
Cross References
Commissioned officers of Public Health Service, applicability of this chapter to, see section
213a of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare
Exclusion from gross income, see sections 72, 101, 122 and 2039 of Title 26, Internal Revenue
Code
Exemption for levy for collection of taxes, see section 6334 of Title 26
Gift tax transfers, payments to beneficiary after death, see section 2517 of Title 26
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, applicability of this chapter to, see section
857a of Title 33, Navigation and Navigable Waters
Repayment of retired pay by beneficiary, see section 8317 of Title 5, Government Organization
and Employees
Retired or retainer pay defined to exclude annuity payable to eligible beneficiary under this
chapter for purposes of dual pay and dual employment provisions, see section 5531 of
Title 5
Retired pay defined, see section 8311 of Title 5

SUBCHAPTER I — R E T I R E D SERVICEMAN'S
F A M I L Y PROTECTION P L A N
Sec.
1431
1432
1433
1434
1435.
1436.
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1437.
1438
1439.
1440.

Election of a n n u i t y members of armed forces
Election of annuity: former members of armed forces.
Mental incompetency of member
Kinds of annuities that may be elected
Eligible beneficiaries
Computation of reduction in retired pay; withdrawal for severe financial hardship
Payment of annuity
Deposits for amounts not deducted
Refund of amounts deducted from retired pay.
Annuities not subject to legal process.
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78-12-1
Section
78-12-44.
78-12-45.
78-12-46.

JUDICIAL CODE
Effect of payment, acknowledgment, or promise to pay.
Action barred in another state
barred here.
"Action" includes special proceeding.

Section
78-12-47.
78-12-48.

Separate trial of statute of limitations issue in malpractice
actions.
Statute of limitations — Asbestos damages.

78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions generally.
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods prescribed in this
chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, except in specific cases where a
different limitation is prescribed by statute.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-1; 1987, ch. 19, § 1.
Cross-References. — Affirmative defense,
statute of limitations as, Rule 8(c), U.R.C.P.
Antitrust Act actions, § 76-10-925.
Cities and towns, claims and actions against,
§§ 11-14-21, 63-30-13, 63-30-15, 78-12-29,
78-12-30.
Collection agency bond, actions on, § 12-1-3.
Common carriers, claims and actions for loss
or damage to freight, § 54-3-16.
Contracts for sale of goods, § 70A-2-725.
Counties, claims and actions against,
§§ 17-15-10, 17-15-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-15,
78-12-30.
Governmental Immunity Act, § 63-30-1 et
seq.

Improvement district proceedings, § 17A-3330.
Insurance
contracts,
actions
on,
§ 31A-21-313.
Marketable record titles, § 57-9-1 et seq.
Municipal bond proceedings, § 11-14-21.
Pleading statute of limitations, Rule 9(h),
U.R.C.P.
Product Liability Act, statute of limitations,
§ 78-15-3.
Protest of solicitation or award of public contract, § 63-56-55.
Public works programs, contesting ordinances and bonds, § 55-3-16.
Securities Act, §§ 61-1-4, 61-1-22.
State,
actions
against,
§§ 63-30-12,
63-30-15.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ity, civil statutes of limitation are inapplicable
to administrative disciplinary proceedings.
Rogers v. Division of Real Estate, 790 P.2d 102
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).

ANALYSIS

Applicability of section.
—Administrative discipline.
Discovery.
Escheat proceedings.
—Applicable foreign law.
Nature and extent of right.
—Legal.
—Renewal of barred action.
—Vested.
Trust estate.
Waiver.
—Failure to plead.
When statute begins to run.
—Commencement of another action.
—Existence of cause of action.
—Particular proceedings.
—Relation back.
Amendment to complaint.
—Remediability of claim.
—Service of summons.

Discovery.
The discovery rule has no application when
an action easily could have been filed between
the date of discovery and the end of the limitation period. Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen
Constr. Co., 744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987).
Escheat proceedings.
—Applicable foreign law.
Five-year limitation period within which
heirs must claim estate to prevent its escheat
after death of intestate without apparent heirs
is subject to provisions of treaty between
United States and country of alien intestate,
requiring actual notice to consular authorities
of intestate's death without apparent heirs. In
re Apostolopoulos' Estate, 68 Utah 344, 250 P.
469, 253 P. 1117, 48 A.L.R. 1322 (1926).

Applicability of section.

Nature and extent of right

—Administrative discipline.
In the absence of specific legislative author-

—Legal.
The statute of limitations governs legal title,
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JUDICIAL CODE

lapse of time, heirs are also barred, had no application where property had been distributed
in accordance with statute, and heir seeking to
recover such property distributed to him while
he was minor within two years after he
attained majority was not barred from maintaining action, since limitation did not start to
run against plaintiff until he had attained majority under this section Robbins v Duggms,
61 Utah 542, 216 P 232 (1923) (decided under
prior law)

—Right to title.
Where defendant purchased tax deed from
county, and immediately thereafter entered
into possession of property, paid taxes on property for statutory time, made valuable improvements on property, and held property
openly and notoriously, he was entitled to have
title to property in controversy against all parties except those under disability Baker v
Goodman, 57 Utah 349, 194 P 117 (1920)

Purchaser at tax sale.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am Jur 2d Limitation
of Actions § 178 et seq
C.J.S. — 54 CJ.S Limitation of Actions
§ 105 et seq

Key Numbers.
70 et seq

Limitation of Actions

ARTICLE 2
OTHER THAN REAL PROPERTY
78-12-22. Within eight years.
Within eight years:
An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States or of
any state or territory within the United States.
An action to enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure to provide
support or maintenance for dependent children.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-22; L. 1975, ch. 96, § 26.
Cross-References. — Execution to issue
within eight years, Rule 69(a), U R C P
Judgment a hen for eight years, § 78-22-1

Uniform Act on Paternity, § 78-45a-l et seq
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act,
§ 78-45-1 et seq
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act § 77-31-1 et seq

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Judgments or decrees
Paternity proceedings
Pleadings
Renewal of judgment
Stipulations
Support or maintenance
Tolling
Cited
Judgments or decrees.
Statute of limitations begins to run from
time of the rendition and entry of judgment or
decree Sweetser v Fox, 43 Utah 40, 134 P
599, 47 L R A (n s ) 145, 1916C Ann Cas 620
(1913)
Where judgment payable in installments
provided that plaintiff could have execution for

total amount due if default in payments should
be made, plain intent was that execution
should issue for only such amounts as were due
at time of default so that statute did not begin
to r w fom date tf default BvielW Dvrci^sra
Mercantile Co , 64 Utah 391,231 P 123 (1924)
In case of a judgment payable in installments, statute runs from time fixed for payment of each installment for the part then payable, and not from date of the judgment Buell
v Duchesne Mercantile Co , 64 Utah 391, 231
P 123 (1924)
In actions for fraud, statute does not begin to
run until fraud is discovered or could have
been reasonably discovered, but even when action is not based on fraud, in equity where
cause of action is concealed from one in whom
it resides by the one against whom it lies, the
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial
§§ 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191.
C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S. New Trial §§ 13 et seq.,
115, 116, 122 to 127.
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating*
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case,
after expiration of term or time prescribed by
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion
or comments by judge as to compromise or settlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457.
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits
in opposition toj motion for new trial in civil
case, 7 AL.R.3d 1000.
Quotient verdicts, 8A.LR.3d335

t i o ^ ^

Amendment, after expiration of time for filing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion
made in due time, 69 A.l<.R.3d 845.
Authority of state court to order jury trial in
civil case where jury has been waived or not
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041.
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on
appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170.
j ^ y triai wa iver as binding on later state
c i v i l tris^f 43 A.L.R.4th 747.
Couit reporter's death or disability prior to
transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or
| 7 A L J U t h 1049.
new ^
Propriety of limiting to issue of damages

^T^^^^AL^

which they are written, 10 A L.R.3d 501.
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by
jury in civil case of scene of accident or premises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15
A.L.R.3d 1101.
Absence ofjudge from courtroom during trial
of civil case, 25 A.LH.3d 637.
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in
case, or with partner or associate of such attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64
A.L.R.3d 126.

quacy of damages-modern cases, 5 A.L.R.5th
„*
,
c
J Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory
*»**&*forPersonal injury to or death of sea*** ^ a**10*8 ™*« J ° n e s A c t <46 USCS
Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness —
modern cases, 96 A.L.R. Fed. 541.
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of damages for personal injury, or death in actions under Federal Employers Liability Act (45 USCS
§§51 et seq.) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R. Fed.
189.
Key Numbers. — New Trial *=» 13 et seq.,
HO, 116.

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
25
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obtaining any relieffroma judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 60, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

"Any other reason justifying relief."
—Default judgment.
—Impossibility of compliance with order.
—Incompetent counsel.
—Lack of due process.
—Merits of case.
—Mistake or inadvertence.
—Mutual mistake.
—Real party in interest.
—Refund of fine after dismissal.
Appeals.
Clerical mistakes.
—Computation of damages.
—Correction after appeal.
—Date of judgment.
Void judgment.
—Estate record.
—Inherent power of courts.
—Intent of court and parties.
—Judicial error distinguished.
—Order prepared by counsel.
—Predating of new trial motion.
Court's discretion.
Default judgment.
Effect of set-aside judgment.
—Admissions.
Form of motion.
Fraud.
—Burden of proof.
—Divorce action.
Independent action.
—Constitutionality of taxes.
—Divorce decree.
—Fraud or duress.
—Motion distinguished.
Invalid summons.
—Amendment without notice.
Inequity of prospective application.
Jurisdiction.
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect.
—Default judgment
-—Illness.
Inconvenience.
Meritorious.
Merits of claim.
Negligence of attorney.
No claim for relief.
—Delayed motion for new trial.
—Factual error.
—Failure to file cost bill.
—Failure to file notice of appeal.
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings.
—Trial court's discretion.
—Unemployment compensation appeal.
—Workmen's compensation appeal.
Newly discovered evidence.
—Burden of proof.
-Discretion not abused.
Procedure.
—Notice to parties.
*ks judicata.

Reversal of judgment.
—Invalidation of sale.
Satisfaction, release or discharge.
—Accord and satisfaction.
—Discharging representative of estate from
further demand.
—Erroneously included damages.
—Prospective application of judgment.
Timeliness of motion.
—Confused mental condition of party.
—Dismissal for lack of prosecution.
—Fraud.
—Invalid service.
—Judicial error.
—Jurisdiction.
—Mistake, inadvertence and neglect.
—Newly discovered evidence.
—Order entered upon erroneous assumption.
—"Reasonable time."
—Reconsideration of previously denied motion.
—Satisfaction.
Unauthorized appearance.
Void judgment.
—Basis.
—Lack of jurisdiction.
Cited.
"Any other reason justifying relief."
Subdivision (7) embodies three requirements: First, that the reason be one other than
those listed in Subdivisions (1) through (6); second, that the reason justify relief; and third,
that the motion be made within a reasonable
time. Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657
P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982); Richins v. Delbert
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
Where a defendant's motion to set aside
judgment based on Subdivisions (b)(1) and (7)
and his motion for a new trial claimed that
plaintiff violated Rule 5(a) on several occasions
by not providing defendant with a copy of
pleadings, thereby causing surprise, centering
on plaintiffs failure to provide a copy of his
motion for summary judgment to defendant,
which the latter claimed was a clear showing
of fraud on plaintiffs part, the trial court could
have believed in denying defendant's motion,
that fraud was not present in what could be
considered a lapse in procedure by plaintiffs
counsel. Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Defendant's claim that he mistakenly entered into an ill-advised stipulation without
fully understanding its consequences was correctly characterized by trial court as mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or neglect under Subdivision (b)(1); because Subdivision (b)(1) applied, Subdivision (b)(7) could not apply and
could not be used to circumvent the threemonth filing period. Richins v. Delbert
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
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